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 11.  Introduction 
 
It is now a well documented fact that output volatility in the U.S. has declined dramatically in the 
last twenty years, particularly during the 1990s, as shown by Blanchard and Simon (2000), 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002), Stock and 
Watson (2002), among others. However, there is less consensus on the causes of its decline. Better 
control of inventories is presented as a cause for lower volatility by Taylor (2000), and Kahn, 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002). Blanchard and Simon (2000) find evidence that output 
volatility has declined with inflation volatility. Blanchard and Simon (2000), Taylor (2000) and 
Romer (1999) suggest that more effective monetary and fiscal policies may have contributed to the 
reduction of business cycle volatility. Finally, all these authors agree that the shocks that hit the G-7 
economies have been fewer and smaller in the last twenty years.  
Another strand of literature examines the role of international trade and international financial 
integration. Razin and Rose (1992) and Buch, Dopke and Pierdzioch (2002) try to find empirical 
evidence that greater commercial and financial openness can explain the decline of output volatility 
in many countries. Both use panel data analysis to support their hypothesis. Razin and Rose (1992) 
estimate a panel of 130 countries over the post-war period, while Buch, Dopke and Pierdzioch 
(2002) restrict their panel analysis to OECD countries in the past 40 years. However, both papers 
fail to find links between openness and output volatility over the period considered. 
In this paper, we examine the causes of the decline of the output gap volatility in the UK and US 
between 1970 and 2001. Unlike most of the papers cited above, we encompass several hypotheses 
in the same econometric framework, since analysing hypotheses individually may lead to omitted 
variable biases in the proposed explanations for the decline of the output gap. Although Blanchard 
and Simon (2000)'s model is quite parsimonious and produces consistent results, various 
commentators on the paper have pointed out that the assumption of exogeneity of inflation 
volatility is possibly misleading.  
We show that inflation volatility is not the only variable that can account for the reduction in 
volatility in the G7. Inventories appear to have little explanatory power. However, we found 
evidence that the increase in trade and financial openness, domestic financial liberalisation, along 
with the reduction of inflation volatility can account for the reduction of the volatility of the output 
gap during the past three decades in the G7. Our results are consistent with the theoretical literature 
that shows that trade and financial liberalisation allow intertemporal risk- sharing, that more   
sophisticated financial markets help individual smooth their consumption decisions over time, and 
that better monetary policies help reduce output volatility.  
Section 2 reviews the main empirical results explaining the decline in volatility. In Section 3, the 
data and the main econometric results are presented. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 22.  Background 
 
In this section we survey the most recent empirical literature on business cycle volatility. We first 
examine the evidence on the dampening of the business cycle and the main proposed explanations.  
  Has output volatility dampened? 
Most of the research based on post-World War II data finds evidence of an increase in volatility 
during the 70s, with a subsequent decline in the mid-80s and 90s. This is the main finding of 
Blanchard and Simon (2000), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Kahn, McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2002), Stock and Watson (2002), who analyse the volatility of the US output growth rate 
between 1953 and 2000. Similar conclusions are reached by Backus and Kehoe (1992) and 
Dalsgaard, Elmeskov, and Park (2000) who investigate 13 and 25 OECD countries, respectively, 
from 1960 to 2000, and Barrell and Mitchell (2003), who focus on the US, the UK, France and 
Germany. 
Papers emphasizing a longer term historical perspective are generally less positive regarding the 
decline of output volatility. Although most of these papers conclude that during the post-World 
War II period volatility has been decreasing, the levels of post-World War II output fluctuations are 
found to be analogous to those observed during the Gold Standard, and not substantially lower. 
Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998) and Basu and Taylor (1999) reach this conclusion by 
investigating the volatility of the business cycle in 13 and 15 countries respectively from 1870 to 
2000, dividing the period into 4 main sub-periods: Gold Standard (1870-1914), Inter War (1919-
1939), Bretton Woods (1945-1972) and the Floating Regime (1972-present). Bergman, Bordo and 
Jonung (1998)'s sample includes only OECD countries, whilst Basu and Taylor (1999) considers 14 
OECD countries and Argentina which was as prosperous as a number of other members of the 
sample before World War II. Romer (1999) does not find a striking difference between the 
volatility of US output before World War I and after World War II, unlike Backus and Kehoe 
(1992).  
These studies generally use different definitions of output volatility. Measuring output volatility 
using either the standard deviation of GDP growth rates or the standard deviation of the filtered 
GDP has little influence on the final conclusion, as is made clear in Table 1. McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2000), Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) and Stock and Watson (2002) favour the 
first measure, whereas Backus and Kehoe (2002), Dalsgaard, Elmeskov, and Park (2000) and Buch, 
Dopke and Pierdzioch (2002) prefer filtering the GDP series using a Baxter-King (1999) band pass 
filter which extracts the trend of GDP from the series whose volatility is studied. This differs 
slightly from the use of the volatility of output growth as it allows trend output growth to change 
over time without this polluting the volatility indicator.  
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Table 1: U.S. output volatility in percent. 
Standard deviation of either the output growth rate or filtered output. 
     
Post War Studies         
     
                           1960s     1970s     1980s  1990s 
      
Stock-Watson       2.2      2.7      2.6    1.5 
      
Dalsgaard et al.     1.8        4.6      3.1    0.7 
     
                       1953:2-1968:4 1969:1-1983:4  1984:1  2000:2 
      
Kahn et al.   4.5   4.8  2.2 
     
     
Longer Term 
Studies 
    
      
                   Pre-WWI  Interwar   Post-  World War II 
      
Backus-Kehoe       4.3      9.3   2.3    
      
Romer          3.0  7.1  2.5   
     
      Gold Standard     Interwar      Bretton Woods  Float (1973-1999) 
      
Basu-Taylor
†   2.7   3.6   2.5   1.6  
      
Source: Stock and Watson (2002), Dalsgaard, Bordo and Jonung (2000), Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002), 
Backus and Kehoe (1992), Romer (1999), and Basu and Taylor (1999).  
In Stock and Watson (2002) the volatility by decade is expressed as a ratio of the volatility of the period 1960-2000, 
which is 2.3%.So, in their paper, the output volatility in the 60s is reported as 0.98%.  
†: Mean of pooled data: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK, US. 
 
The division into sub-periods and the overall time span also differ between studies. Stock and 
Watson (2002) and Dalsgaard, Elmeskov, and Park (2000) divide their sample period in decades 
from 1960 to 2000. Although the absolute values of the volatility are different due to the choice of 
filtering, both papers find that output volatility increased during the 70s, and gradually declined 
from the 80s onwards. Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) present their descriptive 
statistics in line with the findings of their previous research (McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000), 
where the authors show that the volatility of U.S. output growth suffered a structural break in the 
mid-80s. The period covering the 70s, i.e., 1969-1983, has a higher volatility than the previous and 
subsequent period. 
 42.2. What are the causes of the dampening of the business cycle? 
There are many reasons why cycles have become more damped, as appears to have happened. The 
existing literature stresses three major factors, the decline in inflation volatility, which can be a 
consequence of better policy design, the improved management of stocks, and, finally, global 
commercial and financial liberation. 
Blanchard and Simon (2000) emphasize the role of inflation volatility in the decline of output 
growth volatility. They and others link this to the effectiveness of monetary policy. They first 
observe the existence of a strong graphical correlation between the path of the 20-period moving 
average volatility of the US inflation and the 20-period moving average volatility of US output. As 
correlation does not necessarily imply causality, the authors turn to the evidence from other G7 
countries and estimate a panel consisting of all the G7 countries, bar Japan, where the volatility of 
output growth is a function of the inflation level, a time trend and inflation volatility. Their 
modelling rationale for adopting a panel approach is that the major common factor affecting 
inflation and output volatility during the post war period were the supply shocks of the 70s, which 
affected the G7 countries. This panel thus allows them to estimate a relationship between output 
volatility and inflation volatility, controlling for supply shocks. Their results show that inflation is 
not a significant explanatory variable, but the fall in inflation volatility over the period 1953-1999 
appears to explain most of the decline in output volatility. However, the authors admit that 
controlling for factors common to the G7 countries through the use of panel regression, does not 
establish causality between the volatility of inflation and the volatility of output growth. In the 
published discussion some of the commentators on Blanchard and Simon (2000) note that it would 
have been more appropriate to assume instead that inflation volatility is endogenous and attribute 
the decline in both variables to other common factors.  
Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) concentrate on a single explanation of the decline in 
volatility, and found that the volatility of sales did not decline from the mid-80s onwards, whilst the 
volatility of manufacturing production was falling. This discrepancy can be accounted for by 
changes in inventory management, and they find statistical evidence that most of the decrease in 
output growth volatility in the US may be attributed to the fall in the volatility of sales, which in 
turn can be explained by better management of inventories in the mid-80s onwards. Blanchard and 
Simon (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002) reject this hypothesis on the grounds that the 
discrepancy in the behaviour of the volatility of manufacturing output and the volatility of output is 
not robust to the method of analysis, to the series used and to the frequency of data. For instance, 
Stock and Watson (2002) find statistical evidence of a break in the variance of total final sales and 
final sales of durable goods around 1983. Their results are consistent with Ahmed, Levin, and 
Wilson (2002) and Herrera and Pasavento (2002). Stock and Watson (2002) agree with Kahn, 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) that the standard deviation of quarterly growth in 
manufacturing production of durables has declined by less than the standard deviation of quarterly 
 5growth in sales in the period 1984-2001. However, the standard deviations of annual growth in both 
series seem to have declined by very similar amounts. 
The roles of commercial and financial liberalisation and of monetary regimes have been stressed in 
papers analysing the volatility of international business cycles. Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998) 
investigate whether lower output volatility can be viewed as inherent to certain monetary regimes. 
In their paper, the whole sample period 1870-1998 is divided in 4 sub-samples: Gold Standard 
(1870-1914), Interwar (1919-1939), Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods. They found that the 
periods with the lowest volatility of the business cycle were the Gold Standard and the post-Bretton 
Woods period. As these two periods have exactly opposite monetary regimes, the authors argue that 
it is difficult to relate the lower output volatility exclusively to the monetary regime. Their result 
upholds Baxter and Stockman (1989) who found no relationship between monetary regime and 
business cycle volatility. However, Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998)’s study lends support to the 
hypothesis that financial and commercial openness contribute to the reduction of output 
fluctuations. Although the two periods of lowest output volatility during 1870-1998 have different 
monetary regimes, both periods were characterised by high commercial and financial integration. In 
contrast, during the interwar period the volatility of the business cycle was very high, and 
commercial and financial integration very low. Basu and Taylor (1999) argue convincingly that the 
causes of the similar levels of output volatility during the Gold Standard and the post-Bretton 
Woods period may be the low level of trade barriers, the absence of capital controls and higher 
labour mobility.  
The hypothesis that openness can explain the decrease in business cycle volatility is tested by Razin 
and Rose (1992) and Buch, Dopke and Pierdzioch (2002). Neither found evidence of a relationship 
between openness and the volatility of the business cycle. This result prompts us to consider that 
the decline in output volatility may not be exclusively attributed to one or two factors, and that a 
more encompassing approach should be adopted. The coincidence between the low levels of output 
volatility in the Gold Standard and the post-Bretton Woods periods and the high level of trade and 
financial integration in these two periods is compelling. It is clearly not a sufficient explanation, 
however. Globalisation may have lead to the increased ability to spread shocks across countries, 
and hence limit them through risk sharing. However, domestic financial liberalisation also means 
that risks can be transferred over time by individuals. In particular, the reduction in liquidity 
constraints on consumers allows them to distribute shocks to their income over a number of time 
periods. This should reduce the volatility of output as long as shocks do not affect all individuals in 
the country in the same way. Sophisticated domestic financial markets are a characteristic of the 
post- Bretton Woods period exclusively, and should be incorporated in a model explaining the 
volatility of output. 
We can express the existing set of hypotheses within a simple New Keynesian 3 equation 
framework following Svensson (2000) for instance. Output yt depends on the proportion of 
liquidity constrained or inertial consumers, γ1, whose consumption grows at a constant rate (β>1) 
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the expected real interest rate, (rt- ) and who are also influenced by shocks. The proportion of 
liquidity constrained consumers will depend inversely on the stock of net financial assets relative to 
income. We may write this relationship as follows, where 
e
t p ∆





t t t p r y y y ε θ γ β γ + ∆ − − − + = + − )) ( )( 1 ( ) ( 1 1 1 1       ( 1 )  
Shocks to output, t ε , can be come from shocks to the value of holdings of foreign assets, and can be 
dispersed by shocks to the value of liabilities to foreigners. Shocks to output can also come from 
stock building. Prices are set in a Philips curve relationship, where ϖ t is represents structural 
shocks. The structural shocks to this equation will include shocks to the exchange rate. 
t t
e
t t y p p ϖ ϑ + + = +1           ( 2 )  
The slope of the Philips curve will depend on the openness of the economy to trade and production. 
Domestic prices will be less influenced by domestic output in a more open economy and hence ϑ  
will be smaller the more open the economy. The same argument will hold where FDI ensures that 
production is more integrated into the rest of the world.  
There is also a monetary policy feedback rule of the form 
  p
e
t ∆ = λ t r            ( 3 )  
We may write the expected volatility (or variance) of output as 
) ) 1 ( )) 1 /( ) 1 (( 1 /(
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ε β γ ω λ θ β γ γ
− − − −
− + − − − = t t t y
   (4) 
This falls as the number of liquidity constrained consumers, γ1  also falls and hence falls as net 
financial wealth rises as a proportion of nominal income. It rises with the factors that increase the 
variance of the output equation shocks, t ε  and hence increases with stock building, and the value of 
gross foreign assets, and declines with the value of gross foreign liabilities. Some assets and 
liabilities enter net financial wealth, and hence any consumption smoothing role they play will 
operate through that channel, and we will isolate only their shock propagation effects directly. The 
volatility of output rises with the slope of the Philips curve, and hence should decline with openness 
and FDI. 
3.  Econometric analysis  
As was seen in Section 2 above, previous research suggests that the level of volatility of the output 
gap will depend upon the inflation rate (INF), and the volatility of the inflation rate (INFVOL), 
commercial openness (OPEN), stock building and financial integration and liberalisation. Unlike 
trade openness, there is no single measure of financial integration and liberalisation. We can thus 
include several variables that capture capital market integration and financial liberalisation. In order 
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should include stocks of outward foreign direct investment, gross foreign assets and gross foreign 
liabilities. These stock variables are more relevant if we wish to capture inter temporal risk 
spreading than are flow variables, as used by Buch, Dopke and Pierdzioch (2002) and Razin and 
Rose (1992). The existence of a stock of assets allows an individual and a country to absorb the 
shock by running down or increasing asset stocks, but these changes may not be strongly related to 
observed changes in assets, and indeed the existence of the stocks may ensure the economy is more 
stable as the provide insurance as well as reserves. Finally, we include the net wealth of households 
in our econometric analysis to capture the fact that sophisticated financial markets allow individuals 
to absorb shocks and smooth their consumption over time.  
The business cycle is computed using a Baxter-King low bandpass filter on GDP and the output 
gap at point t is the difference between GDP in t and trend output in t. We have estimates for GDP 
on a consistent (quarterly) basis from the early 1960s, and we use these to construct our output gap 
estimates. The first few years of the output gap series is, however, not used in our econometrics 
because of the time restriction on reliable data on foreign direct investment and holdings of foreign 
assets and foreign liabilities. Our sample of rolling widows for the volatility of the output gap 
therefore covers the period 1970-2001. The inflation rate is computed from the consumer price 
index, and its volatility is the 5- year rolling window standard deviation.  
The case for analysing the volatility of filtered output, especially over long periods, is strong, as it 
allows the trend rate of growth of output to vary over time. Filtered output can be used to produce 
estimates of the output gap. Our estimates of the output gaps we use are based on the Baxter-King 
low band pass filter and are the difference between actual and potential output. These gap 
indicators are discussed in Barrell and Mitchell (2003) and in Mitchell, Massman and Weale 
(2003), and are regularly used in policy analysis. The gap will vary in exactly the same way as 
filtered output, but with the opposite sign. Barrell and Mitchell (2003) present decade average 
indictors that show that output gap volatility has been declining in the major four economies since 
1970. For the purposes of this paper it is more useful to construct rolling window estimates of the 
volatility of the output gap. The volatility indicator we use is a five period moving average of the 
root mean squared deviation of the output gap. 
In Charts 1 and 2 we show our estimates of the volatility of the output gap in the G7 using the US 
as a comparator. The most recent cycle seems to be significantly damped in comparison to cycles 
over the last 30 years or so, but the universal decline in output volatility is not absolutely clear. The 
US and the three major continental European economies have a relatively continuous decline in 
volatility, but the UK and Canada have periods of high volatility around and just after 1990, 
 8although overall volatility of the output gap does appear to be declining. Although Japanese output 
gap volatility is lower in the 1990s than in the 1970s, it is higher than in the 1980s
3.  
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3 Barrell (2003) discusses some of the problems with extracting output gaps in Japan where trend output growth has 
declined noticeably between the 1980s and 1990s.  
 9The choice of a rolling standard deviation for measuring volatility over time requires care in 
estimation. Rolling window volatility measures are characterised by strong persistence over a 
number of subsequent time periods at least equal to the size of the window
4.. However, persistence 
of this nature invalidates the assumption of independent errors, which may lead to inconsistent 
estimators, and bias t statistics. We address this issue by using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM), and also by correction for moving average errors. This procedure has been shown to 
produce consistent estimators, even in the case of heteroskedastic and serially correlated errors 
(Hansen (1982) and Hansen and Singleton (1982))
5.  
Our other indicators are not based on rolling windows. Our measure of openness (OPEN) is the 
traditional ratio of total trade volumes (exports plus imports) to GDP. We also use stock building as 
a percent of real GDP (DS), aggregate Gross Assets as a percent of nominal GDP (GA), aggregate 
Gross Liabilities as a percent on nominal GDP (GL), the outward stock of Foreign Direct 
Investment as a percent of nominal GDP (FDI), and Net Financial Wealth of the personal sector as 
a percent of nominal GDP (NW). The assets, liabilities, FDI and net wealth ratios all trend upward 
over time. 
The literature we survey can be seen as constructing a sequence of hypotheses, and it is important 
that we can replicate these on our data set before we draw conclusions. We therefore start with the 
Blanchard and Simon (2000) assumption that output volatility is be determined by the level and 
volatility of inflation and by a time trend. In section 4 Table 2 we use a fixed effect GMM panel 
with and without MA error correction to look at a simple relationship of the form: 
VOLi=F1(INF,INFVOL,TIME)       (5) 
Blanchard and Simon (2000) discuss the potential role of openness but do not test for its effects. 
Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) argued that the decline in the volatility of stocks as 
reflected in the level of stock building had been an important determinant of the decline in 
volatility. However, neither they nor Blanchard and Simon (2000) tested this as an alternative 
hypothesis within the framework of other explanations. In section 4 Table 3 we use a G7 GMM 
panel with and without MA error correction to investigate the competing hypotheses on inflation, 
inflation volatility, openness and stock building that were considered in this US centred debate and 
we look at relationships of the form 
VOLi =F2(OPEN,DS,INF,INFVOL,TIME)      (6) 
Rose and Razin (1992) and Buch, Dopke and Pierzdoch (2002) tested whether foreign direct 
investment and financial and commercial openness might explain output volatility, but they did not 
consider the role of inflation volatility, nor did they sue stocks of assets and liabilities. We therefore 
                                                 
4 See Alexander (1996) for instance. 
5 Using a rolling window does not seem to affect the fact that volatility has declined in the U.S. Blanchard and Simon 
(2000) measure the volatility of output with a rolling standard deviation, and reach the same conclusion as McConnell 
 10consider the competing hypotheses on financial openness and liberalisation and estimate the 
following encompassing relationship in a G7 GMM panel with MMA error corrections.  
VOLi =F3(DS,OPEN,INF,INFVOL,TIME,NW,FDI,GA,GL)     (7) 
Our results for this hypothesis are reported in section 4 Table 4, and we explore them further as 
they encompass the alternatives. At this stage we feel we have a relatively well specified model that 
does not suffer from omitted variables biases, and we can therefore address the important issue of 
the simultaneous determination of output volatility and inflation volatility using an IV panel 
estimator assuming that INFVOL is a jointly endogenous variable in section 4 Tables 5. We report 
results using GMM panel estimates with MA error correction and robust errors
6.  
4. Results 
It is relatively easy for us to recover the standard Blanchard Simon (2000) result, as can be seen 
from the fixed effect Generalised Method of Moments estimator in Table 2. These results would 
lead us to suppose that there was an unexplained trend in the reduction of output volatility which 
could be the result of a number of factors that we discuss above. It appears that the reduction in the 
volatility of the output gap has been driven by the reduction in the level of inflation and the 
reduction in the volatility of inflation that goes with better operation of monetary policy. The test of 
overindentifying restriction is rejected if the serial correlation of errors is not taken into 
consideration. When serial correlation is corrected, the instruments are found to be valid.  
Table 2.  Blanchard-Simon Model  
  Without MA errors   With MA(5)errors 
Variable    Estimate    t-statistic    Estimate    t-statistic  
INF    0.00002083**      1.99    0.00002859*    3.56   
INFVOL    0.00041068*   4.90       0.00028660*   3.67  
TIME    -0.00002193*     -4.21      -0.00002172*  -7.74  
GMM estimation. Model without MA errors: Test of overidentifying restrictions (J Test):chi^2(11)=25.3969[.008]. 
Model with MA errors: J Test:chi^2(11)=5.87208[.882]; LR test:chi^2(3)=-0.13[1.00]. In this and all subsequent tables, 
* and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
  
However, we should be cautious about the use of unexplained trends when explaining a series such 
as the volatility of the output gap, and we can utilise the other indicators that Blanchard and Simon 
(2000) and others were suggesting might be of importance. Table 3 adds our openness indicator, 
which generally trends upward, but in different ways in different countries, unlike a time trend. We 
also add stock building to see if the widely circulating single variable explanation of lower output 
volatility holds up in a comparative context. There is clearly a strong role for openness, and it 
knocks out the time trend, but there appears to be no separate role for stock building. This latter 
result does not surprise us, as stock building and stock holding and imports are clear substitutes in 
                                                                                                                                                                   
and Perez-Quiros (2000), Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) and Stock and Watson (2002) and Dalsgaard, 
Elmeskov, and Park (2000) who compute the standard deviations of output growth over fixed periods 
6 (1), (2) and  (3) were estimated in TSP 4.5 by the GMM procedure, with correction for 5-lag moving average errors.  
 11the production process, and a more open economy should need fewer stocks. Hence the explanation 
of the declining volatility of output by stocks alone appears inadequate. The model specified in 
Table 3 leaves a strong role for the policy related variables, but augments the simpler explanation in 
Table 2 with more economic content. Adjustment for moving average errors reduces the 
significance of inflation, and in general reduces the size of coefficients, but it does not change the 
structure of our results. 
Table 3.  Augmented Blanchard Simon Model  
  Without MA error correction  With MA(5) error correction 
Variable    Estimate    t-statistic     Estimate    t-statistic  
INF   0.00002808*    2.41       0.00002642**    2.10  
INFVOL   0.00079379*   5.91   0.00073359*    3.945   
TIME    -0.00000231    -0.37       -0.00000714    -1.20    
DS    0.01190200    1.33           0.00011091    0.01  
OPEN   -0.00276366*    -4.56   -0.00224363*    -4.02 
GMM estimation. Model without MA errors, J Test:chi^2(23)=66.77[.000] 
.Model with MA errors: J Test:chi^2(23)=24.3072[.39].  
 
Financial liberalisation and the removal of international capital controls in the last 30 years have 
had a major impact on the level of wealth held in economies and on its structure. There has been a 
rise in wealth to income ratios, and both gross assets held abroad (mainly by companies) and 
liabilities owed to foreign residents have also risen. Both domestic and foreign wealth stocks 
provide some sort of insurance, and should help on average to absorb shocks. If wealth stocks are 
high consumption can be smoothed in response to income shocks, at least on an individual basis, 
and this should reduce the volatility of output. In particular if fewer individuals are liquidity 
constrained then more of a fall in incomes can be absorbed by changing wealth rather than 
consumption, and hence we should expect to see more stable output. If assets are held abroad then 
consumption can be smoothed by a country by absorbing the shock in a change in the asset position 
and hence possibly exporting shocks to other countries.  
A reduction in the level of assets total national held abroad absorbs the shock if it involves a sale of 
assets, and it exports part of the shock if it involves a reduction in the price of a liability, such as 
foreign holdings of domestic equities. Hence we would expect the growth of international 
portfolios to reduce the volatility of output. The growth of foreign direct investment also ensures 
that countries cycles are more linked by ensuring that production processes and levels of 
investment in productive capital are linked across countries within firms, but it is not clear that this 
will damp cycles. In Table 4 we add indicators of financial and international capital market 
integration (GA for gross foreign assets as a ratio of nominal GDP, GL for gross assets as a ratio of 
nominal GDP and FDI for the stock of outward FDI as a ratio of nominal GDP) to our expanded 
model in Table 3. We report only the estimates with MA error corrections. 
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Table 4 Encompassing Model Fixed Effect Estimator. Estimation with MA(5) errors. 
 
Non-IV estimation  IV estimation 
Full Model                              Model 1                             Model 2 
Variable   Estimate    t-stat.     Estimate         t-stat   Estimate    t-stat.    Estimate    t-stat. 
INF       1.60E-05       1.63       1.94E-05         1.79           
INFVOL   6.48E-04*    5.12      6.89E-04*      4.96     7.18E-04*    5.71  5.47E-04*   3.05 
TIME      9.13E-06       1.20       1.15E-05         1.68           
DS        2.99E-03       0.43       3.25E-03         0.49           
OPEN     -2.69E-03*   -3.50    -2.32E-03*    -3.19   -2.34E-03 *   -5.70    -2.0E-03*  -5.48   
NW       -5.25E-04*   -2.77    -4.55E-04*    -2.63   -6.15E-04*    -5.60  -4.65E-04*  -3.53   
FDI      -1.45E-03       -1.37     -1.19E-03        -1.22          
GA       5.99E-04*    2.80      4.62E-04*      2.40    5.50E-04*    3.07       
GL       -4.71E-04**   -2.27   -4.63E-04**   -2.45  -4.80E-04*    -2.70       
Non-IV estimation: Test of overindentifying restrictions (J-Test):chi^2(47)=46.44[.496].  
IV estimation Full model: J-Test: chi^2(47) = 51.22 [.81],  
IV estimation Model 1: J-Test: chi^2(65) = 50.32 [.91], LR Test: of deletions from full model chi^2(4) = 0.9 [0.92].  
IV estimation Model 2: J-Test: chi^2(24) =28.92 [.22], LR Test: of deletions from Model 1 chi^2(2) =3.01[1.0]. 
 
In our encompassing regression in Column 1 the time trend and stock building remain insignificant. 
However, the pattern and significance of other variables is of interest. Inflation volatility appears to 
remain an important explanatory variable, whilst inflation is not significant. Openness remains 
significant and negative, suggesting that trade openness has a role to play in damping cycles with 
more open economies having less volatile output all else equal. Financial wealth appears to have a 
similar but less significant impact on volatility, suggesting that as liquidity constraints become less 
important output becomes more stable. However, the importance of wealth as a stabiliser at the 
macro level depends on the nature of shocks that the economy faces. If they are common to all 
individuals in the economy then wealth alone cannot act as a shock absorber unless a significant 
amount is held with non-residents. It is interesting to note that the larger are gross liabilities to other 
the smaller the volatility of output, suggesting that equity risk is shifted to others as liabilities 
increase. As the country faces solvency constraint gross assets and gross liabilities must grow 
approximately in line with each other. However, foreign assets pool risks from other countries, and 
our results indicate that a greater asset stock increases volatility as wealth changes for reasons 
external to the country in question. In particular an asset position makes a country vulnerable to 
asset price changes abroad, and form a major channel for the propagation of equity price shocks. 
Given that the coefficient on gross assets in this regression exceeds that of gross liabilities it is 
possible that increasing international portfolios increases output volatility across the major 
economies. However, some of the effects of holding foreign assets and liabilities will be reflected 
 13in the stabilising impact of net financial wealth, as some of the assets and liabilities are directly 
(and indirectly but transparently) held by the personal sector. The stock of FDI is not significant.  
Although the wider explanation is pleasing, there remains the problem of the potential endogeneity 
of inflation volatility. If there is a policy regime change then we might expect that output volatility 
and inflation volatility would change in the same direction, with more volatile output being 
associated with more volatile inflation. Hence the unexplained change in output volatility would be 
potentially associated with the unexplained component of inflation volatility. In this situation the 
coefficient on inflation volatility in the output volatility regression is likely to be biased upward and 
look more significant. However, this will not always be the case, as some regime shifts, such as 
fixing the exchange rate or joining a monetary union, may reduce inflation volatility at the expense 
of greater output volatility. In either case the solution is to use an appropriate estimation technique. 
As our panel is static we can rely on panel IV within a GMM framework, where we specifically 
instrument inflation volatility with the lagged values of other regressors.  
The pattern of results from Table 4, column 1, is generally maintained in column 2. Inflation 
volatility, openness, net wealth and gross assets and liabilities remain the only significant variables. 
The coefficient on inflation volatility rises marginally. Increased openness reduces output volatility, 
as does a greater stock of net financial wealth. The coefficients on assets and liabilities to foreigners 
are now equal and opposite in sign, suggesting that greater financial integration neither increases 
nor reduces volatility on average. There remains no significant role for inflation, stock building or 
FDI stocks, and the time trend is not significant.  
The pattern of significance of the variables suggests that we can estimate a more parsimonious 
description of the data. Two reduced models were estimated, and are presented as Model 1 and 
Model 2 in Table 4. The first model follows directly from the estimation of Column 2, as it 
excludes the variables with insignificant coefficients. The second model includes only inflation 
volatility, openness and net wealth as gross assets and liabilities have approximately equal and 
opposite signs. All coefficients are significant and have the expected signs. Model 2 still allows a 
role for (household) net foreign assets in the reduction of output volatility, since NW includes some 
components of foreign gross assets and gross liabilities. The LR test of the validity of exclusion of 
inflation, FDI, Time and DS is accepted for model 1 and an analogous test for Model 2 is also 
accepted. Under the null, these tests are distributed as Chi^2(r) where r is the number of excluded 
variables
7.The tests of overidentifying restrictions are accepted in all cases, including for the 
reduced models.  
We may take our most parsimonious model as a good representation of the factors affecting output 
volatility. They have varied over time, as has output volatility. We can summarise the relative 
importance of the factors for the UK and the US. A rise in openness of one percent of GDP would 
reduce UK output volatility by 5.8 per cent of its level in 2000, whilst a one percent reduction in the 
                                                 
7 See Matyas (1999), Chapter 4. for details. 
 14level of inflation volatility would reduce output volatility by 1.3 per cent of its level in 2000, and a 
one per cent of nominal income increase in net financial wealth would reduce output volatility by 
1.3 per cent of its level in 2000. A rise in openness of one percent of GDP would reduce US output 
volatility by 2.2 per cent of its level in 2000, whilst a one percent reduction in the level of inflation 
volatility would reduce output volatility by 0.3 per cent of its level in 2000, and a one per cent of 
nominal income increase in net financial wealth would reduce output volatility by 0.5 per cent of its 
level in 2000. 
Table 5. Impact of changes in openness, inflation volatility and household wealth on output 
volatility 
  UK  US 
  80-70 90-80 80-70 90-80 
Open  0.0081 0.0088 -0.2092  -0.0705 
Infvol  -0.2093 -0.0433 0.0192  -0.0375 
NW  -0.1412 -0.1901 0.0023  -0.1041 
Note Impact of change in decade average value of independent variables 
We can also use the same model to assess the relative contributions to the reduction in inflation 
volatility on a decade by decade basis. In Table 5 we give the contribution to the fall explained by 
the change in the average values of our indicators in the 1980s as compared to the 1970s (and 
1990s as compared to1980s). Openness changes in the US made significant impacts on the level of 
output volatility in both the 1980s and 1990s whilst the increase in net wealth in the 1990s helped 
reduce output volatility. In the UK the reduction in inflation volatility in the 1980s was the main 
factor reducing output volatility, whilst in the 1990s increasing levels of net wealth wee more 
important. Clearly all three factors play an important role, but their importance varies from country 
to country and across time. 
4.Conclusion 
It is widely reported that output volatility has been declining in the last few decades, and a number 
of explanations have been offered. Three separate candidates have been discussed, with changes in 
policy regime taking precedence over improved stockholding as determinants of output volatility, 
whilst increased international integration has largely been disregarded as an explanation. We 
investigate output volatility in the G7 in a panel context treating these as competing explanations 
rather than as alternatives to be considered one at a time. We show that an encompassing panel has 
a significant role for both net financial wealth and openness to trade as factors stabilizing output 
volatility. The policy regime as indicated by inflation volatility does appear to continue to play a 
role even when we recognize its potential endogeneity and use appropriate econometric techniques. 
However, its importance clearly varies over time and across countries, and it appears less important 
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